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TAXING & ZAPPING MARIJUANA:
BLOCKCHAIN COMPLIANCE IN THE TRUMP ADMINISTRATION
Part 3
Richard T. Ainsworth
Brendan Magauran
This is the third of a five-part series dealing with the rescission by U.S. Attorney General
Jeff Sessions of the Obama-era policy that discouraged federal prosecutors from bringing
charges in all but the most serious marijuana cases. The federal laws at issue are the Controlled
Substances Act (CSA) and the Bank Secrecy Act (BSA). Twenty-eight states and the District of
Columbia have laws that conflict with the CSA and BSA because of their legalization of
marijuana.
There are four basic fraud vectors through which criminal organizations may exploit the
standard marijuana supply chain. Figure 1 (also discussed in parts 1 and 2 of this series) shows
the 14 leakage points and four major fraud vectors in the standard METRC-protected marijuana
supply chain. This article focuses on cyber-attacks on the main commercial chain – producing
leaks at points 2 through 12.
Cyber-attack on the main commercial chain – leakage points [2] - [12]
This fraud is a direct, criminal attack; an attack designed to destroy/corrupt records of
marijuana inventory and plant tags throughout the supply chain. The attack allows legalized
marijuana to escape the system and be sold on the black market. A large scale cyber-attack
impacts every commercial enterprise, transporter, and testing laboratory. See Figure 1 (below).
If successful, a malicious cyber-attack would open up each “leakage point,” [2] through [12] in
the main commercial chain. Control collapses.

1
Electroniccopy
copyavailable
available at:
at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3239977
Electronic
https://ssrn.com/abstract=3239977

Figure 1:
Cyber Attack Frauds in METRC-protected Marijuana Supply Chains
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All track and trace systems are designed around a centralized ledger.1 They endeavor to
be permanent (immutable).2 Most are hosted, cloud-based, near-real-time systems that record
marijuana inventory movements. The collected data is held on multiple vulnerable (or hackable)
servers, and similarly vulnerable (hackable) State servers.
Hacking a major track and trace system is not merely a theoretical possibility. It
happened to the largest (and oldest) system. Hackers took down MJ Freeway’s Leaf Data
System nationwide.3 The seriousness of this hack was all too apparent to the government of
Nevada which notified MJ Freeway on September 12, 2017 that, because of vulnerabilities in its

1

Centralized ledgers are highly vulnerable to fraud, data corruption, and malicious attacks. Blockchain technology
replaces centralized ledgers. Blockchain is a robust, secure, transparent distributive ledger that survives malicious
attacks. Aaron Wright & Primavera De Filippi, Decentralized Blockchain Technology and the Rise of Lex
Cryptographia, (March 12, 2015) available at: http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2580664
2
Data entered into METRC cannot be changed, although errors can be corrected. Patrick McCleary, MTRC is
Coming! Learning the Basics of METRC Compliance, Part II, FLOWHUB (November 7, 2017) available at:
https://flowhub.co/2017/11/07/metrc-coming-learning-basics-metrc-compliance-part-ii/
3
Alex Halperin, Cannabis Company Cyberattack Reveals Industry’s Vulnerability to Hacking, LA WEEKLY
(February 6, 2017) (indicating that, “MJ Freeway is the largest provider of software to cannabis businesses –
including grows, factories and shops — suffered a major crash, crippling all of its customers.”) available at:
http://www.laweekly.com/news/cannabis-company-cyberattack-reveals-industrys-vulnerability-to-hacking-7895250
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system, the State was terminating its five-year contract (after less than two-years) effective
November 1, 2017. Nevada switched to METRC.4
MJ Freeway sustained a series of hacks. They were aimed at widely corrupting (not
stealing) track and trace files. The data targeted was sales, inventory, customer identity, and
cultivation data (plant height, strains and yields). No data was extracted in the attacks.
Encryption protections prevented HIPPA violations. However, large amounts of historical
inventory data were lost. Nevada’s traceability system was
… knocked offline … [as was] the State’s entire ability to function with its cannabis
program … The hack was aimed at corrupting files and data and it was
unprecedented in terms of its sophistication, and it impacted both our live or
production servers, as well as our backup servers. We have multiple backup servers
and multiple redundancy, and we have them in multiple locations and with multiple
companies. The attack hit all of them. 5
The specific incidents that have been reported are concentrated at the end of 2016 and the
first few weeks of 2017. All together the damage extended for a full six months. The system
was seriously compromised for a considerable period of time. The reported incidents were:
• December 27, 2016 – [State hack] Justin Shafer uncovers a leak of personal information
in Nevada – the full applications of 11,771 individuals who applied to the State of
Nevada Medical Marijuana Program under NRS 453A.117 6
• January 7, 2017 – [first direct MJ Freeway hack] a malicious intrusion into MJ Freeway’s
digital information platform brought down Leaf Data Systems – hundreds of clients were
thrown offline.
• January 8, 2017 – [second MJ Freeway hack] the MJ Freeway site became unusable, and
went offline for all of its clients.
• January 16, 2017 – MJ Freeway is back on line, and data recovery is attempted.
• June 15, 2017 – [third MJ Freeway hack] MJ Freeway’s source code is stolen and posted
on Reddit and Gitlab.com. 7
MJ Freeway provides software both (a) to the taxpayers in the commercial chain
(cultivator, manufacturer, testing labs, distributors and retailers) and (b) to the government
regulator that owns and operates the State portal. It provides data transmission and storage
services for users and regulators. Because the MJ Freeway attack targeted the whole system the
damage was substantial. Figure 2 diagrams an MJ Freeway installation.

4

On November 29, 2017 California adopted METRC, making METRC arguably the largest track and trace system
deployed in the US.
5
Tom Hynes, Anatomy of the MJ Freeway Hack, MG NEWS FOR CANNABIS PROFESSIONALS (January 20, 2017)
available at: https://mgretailer.com/anatomy-mj-freeway-hack/
6
More than 10,000 Medical Marijuana Establishment Agent Applicants in Nevada had their Personal Info Exposed
Online (December 27, 2016) available at: https://www.databreaches.net/more-than-10000-medical-marijuanaestablishment-agent-applicants-in-nevada-had-their-personal-info-exposed-online/
7
Aaron G. Biros, MJ Freeway’s Source Code Stolen & Published Online, CANNABIS INDUSTRY JOURNAL (June 20,
2017) available at: https://www.cannabisindustryjournal.com/news_article/mj-freeways-source-code-stolenpublished-online/
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The diagram below shows transmissions from MJ Freeway software at each registered
marijuana business. These are daily inventory measures. They also track changes in the tracking
numbers on each marijuana plant or product. The MJ Freeway client software is represented by
a “can,” (symbolizing a computer hard drive). This data transmission goes through the main MJ
Freeway computers (represented by another “can”). From there it is stored by MJ Freeway in
multiple (redundant) servers which back-up client data (for the client), and are also reported to
the state through the on-line portal. Artificial intelligence is applied to this data base by the state
performing risk analysis.

Figure 2:
MJ Freeway Installation
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MJ Freeway is understandably cautious about discussing the hack of its system in the
press or even with law enforcement. The early phase of the hack preceded the Trump
administration, but the impact of the hack continued into the first six months of Trump’s tenure.
Immediately after the first wave of attacks Jeanette Ward, Vice President, Global Marketing and
Communications made it clear that the company was not reporting the hack to the FBI:
If we were not a cannabis company, federal law enforcement would handle this
cybercrime, but we are not referring this to the FBI. One, we’re not sure how
interested they would be, but also out of respect for our clients, who would not be
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too keen to hear this case has been referred to the FBI and they are potentially
digging through this information. 8
Now that the cyber-attack is over, every post, public statement, and article on this
incident walks around the elephant in the room – why did it happen? MJ Freeway’s explanation
is echoed widely. The attack was likely from an unhappy employee or by someone with a
political interest in taking down the system. But, this was a highly sophisticated, criminal attack,
one that is normally accompanied by a demand for ransom. However, “[t]here are no signs of
ransomware nor was a ransom demanded by the attackers …”9 If there was no ransom demand,
no stolen data, and as of today, no one held accountable,10 then why did it occur? One cyber
commentator thought out loud as follows:
Okay, this is interesting. Did the hacker(s) intend to corrupt the data or was that a
byproduct of a failed attempt to access/exfiltrate encrypted data? What was the
motivation behind this attack? To get data for extortion? To interfere with access
to marijuana? To try to cross-match with another database for political purposes?
Something else?11
The “something else” is very likely – the opening of every “leakage point,” [2] through
[12], in the main commercial chain so that legal marijuana could enter the black market
undetected. The commercial marijuana businesses were clearly distracted. Nationwide, every
business in MJ Freeway system went into overdrive at the front door recording transactions on
paper, and then manually inputting data into local data bases. The state portals run by MJ
Freeway were down. So, while all this was going on it is very likely (but unverified) that
marijuana was leaving the system undetected through the back door. Acknowledging this during
Trump’s administration would not be optimal – hence the elephant in the room.
Preventing cyber-attacks on the main commercial chain
Cyber-attacks aimed at destroying reliable data in a commercial chain have a lot in
common with VAT frauds that rely on obscuring transaction data behind rows of false “buffer”
entities. Both are defeated by systems that lay bare and preserve highly trustworthy, real-time
data about the intra-entity transactions within the commercial chain. AI has become very good at
risk-analyzing these data flows.
Before blockchain, securing this data was difficult. Ledgers holding it were centralized,
digital silos vulnerable to attack. The new VATs being deployed in the six states of the Gulf

8

Jeanette Ward of MJ Freeway interviewed by Tom Hymes, in Anatomy of the MJ Freeway Hack,
MGRETAILER.COM (January 20, 2017) available at: https://mgretailer.com/anatomy-mj-freeway-hack/
9
Milena Dimitrova, MJ Freeway Software Platform Targeted by Hackers, SENSORS TECH FORUM (January 12,
2017) available at: https://sensorstechforum.com/mj-freeware-software-cannabis-platform-attacked/
10
Tyler Koslow, Leading Marijuana Sales Software Struggles to Recuperate from Systems Hack, MERRY JANE
(February 4, 2018) available at: https://merryjane.com/news/mj-freeway-cannabis-sales-software-hacked
11 Dan Adams, Marijuana dispensaries hit by hack of tracking software system DATABREACHES.NET (January 10,
2017) available at: https://www.databreaches.net/marijuana-dispensaries-hit-by-hack-of-tracking-software-system/
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Cooperation Council (GCC) are designed for distributive ledgers, or bockchain compliance.12
The same is true of the five states of the East African Community (EAC).13
Blockchain creates a robust, secure, (fully or selectively) transparent14 distributive
The technique is revolutionary. Blockchain is a software protocol based on
cryptography, devised in 2008, and announced simultaneously with its most famous application
– Bitcoin.16
ledger.15

Bitcoin (an application) is often confused with blockchain (a form of distributed ledger
technology).17 Recording Bitcoin transactions is only one application of blockchain technology;
tracking commercial marijuana transactions is another. Ledger entries in the Bitcoin application
are the Bitcoins generated by the Bitcoin protocol. In a marijuana protocol, the entries would be
specifically identified plants, or grams of marijuana linked back to an identified plant. This
difference is significant.
Marijuana is not inherently digital. As a result, external marijuana data in the supply
chain must be securely transferred to the blockchain. There is, however, a problem trusting the
transfer of external data into a blockchain. The problem exists because no matter how secure the
blockchain is, if the data uploaded to it comes from unsecure API’s, the unsecure API’s become
easy targets of data manipulation before the data enters the secure blockchain. The solution
adopted here is to use a tamper proof blockchain middleware (Chainlink) to bridge the gap so

The GCC is a regional intergovernmental political and economic alliance of six Middle Eastern countries –
Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and he United Arab Emirates. It was formed in 1981. Richard T.
Ainsworth & Musaad Alwohaibi, The First Rael-Time Blockchain VAT: GCC Solves MTIC Fraud 86 TAX NOTES
INTERNATIONAL 695 (May 22, 2017).
13
The East African Community (EAC) is a regional intergovernmental organization of 6 Partner States: the
Republics of Burundi, Kenya, Rwanda, South Sudan, the United Republic of Tanzania, and the Republic of Uganda,
with its headquarters in Arusha, Tanzania. Richard T. Ainsworth & Goran Todorov, Stopping VAT Fraud with
DICE – Digital Invoice Customs Exchange, 72 TAX NOTES INTERNATIONAL 637 (November 18, 2013). Richard T.
Ainsworth & Goran Todorov, Plugging the Leaks in the East African Community’s VATs, 72 TAX NOTES
INTERNATIONAL 561 (November 11, 2013).
14
Blockchain is not inherently transparent – when used in a private / permissioned setting, information is only as
transparent as the permissions in the network let it be. The key is the permissions that are set for each party. This is
the case with the blockchain applied here. The public blockchain applied in the CALCoin solution further below, is
far more transparent.
15
A ledger, as used in this sentence and in this field generally, means a value recording and transfer system. Simply
stated, a ledger is an accounting tool that keeps track of who owns what. Ledgers have long been digitized (in the
20th century), but it was only with blockchain that they have been decentralized. Prior to 2008 ledgers were only
understood as centralized. Blockchain therefore, is really just one version of a distributed ledger, with its main
feature being that it has provenance among its transactions which are cryptographically secured in a decentralized
manner.
16
Satoshi Nakamoto, Bitcoin, A peer-to-peer electronic cash system (2008) available at:
https://bitcoin.org/bitcoin.pdf (note: Satoshi Nakamoto is a pseudonym).
17
For a general and introductory discussion of blockchain, see: Michael Crosby, Nachiappan, Pradhan Pattanayak,
Sanjeev Verma & Vignesh Kalyanaraman, Blockchain Paper: Beyond Bitcoin, PANTAS AND TING SUTARDJA
CENTER FOR ENTREPRENEURSHIP & TECHNOLOGY (October 16, 2015) available at:http://scet.berkeley.edu/wpcontent/uploads/BlockchainPaper.pdf
12
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that external data sources connect securely to the blockchain and allow smart contracts 18 within
the blockchain to communicate with external resources on their own. 19
It is axiomatic that wherever distributive ledgers are adopted, they will replace
centralized ledgers. The MJ Freeway system is precisely this kind of multiple-redundant
centralized ledger system that will be/should be disrupted (replaced) by a blockchain.20
Blockchain technology is nearly trustless,21 in the sense that it does not require
centralized third-party verification. 22 That is, it does not need a single trusted third party (a
bank, or bank-like entity) to negotiate value transfer. In marijuana track and trace systems MJ
Freeway, METRC, and other TAT and STS providers emulate banks. In marijuana control
regimes, they are the trusted third parties that keep silos of centralized data. That data can be
hacked and their systems fatally compromised.
Blockchain uses powerful consensus mechanisms to verify the authentic history of
transactions in the database and secures new transactions when they are added into the main

18

A smart contract is a computer protocol intended to digitally facilitate, verify, or enforce the negotiation or
performance of a contract. Hyperledger Fabric, the blockchain selected by this paper to run the marijuana
blockchain, utilizes the term “chaincode” instead of smart contracts. A chaincode is software, running on a ledger,
to encode assets and the transaction instructions (business logic) for modifying the assets.
19
Securely entering inputs and outputs of non-digital content to a digital chain is a challenge. Any smart contracts
within the system will be relying on unsecure human actors to provide triggering information to the smart contracts.
For example, if cultivators selectively scan RFID codes, the validators will capture all reported data while missing
out on the true volume of production. As Internet of Things (IOT) sensors advance, it may be possible to create
adapters that allow their signals to interact directly with a blockchain middleware (such as the Chainlink project, a
decentralized Oracle Network). They would be able to securely transfer triggering information into a smart contract,
uploading marijuana cultivation data directly to the blockchain. The same process could be repeated for
transportation information or any other objective data points. Steve Ellis, Ari Juels & Sergey Nazarov, ChainLink –
A Decentralized Oracle Network (September 4, 2017) available at: https://link.smartcontract.com/whitepaper.
Although it is beyond the scope of this paper, if such a marijuana blockchain was adopted, the commercial
contracts between parties in the marijuana supply chain could also be executed through this blockchain using
Chainlink. The current paper contracts could be digitized such that data stored in the marijuana blockchain would
provide triggering contract information for payments. For example, a cultivator could receive payment
automatically from a distributer upon the blockchain confirming the transfer of marijuana from the cultivator to the
distributor.
20
Aaron Wright & Primavera De Filippi, Decentralized Blockchain Technology and the Rise of Lex Cryptographia,
(March 12, 2015) at 4-8, available at: http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2580664.
21
The trust element is very important to the adoption of blockchain in tax compliance areas. It needs to be stressed
that trusting the blockchain technology is different than trusting Bitcoin. Europol contends that it is not blockchain,
but the “… Bitcoin [application that] is establishing itself as the single common currency for cybercriminals within
the EU.” Europol, 2015 INTERNET ORGANIZE CRIME THREAT ASSESSMENT, Key Findings available at:
https://www.europol.europa.eu/iocta/2015/key-findings.html
22
There remains an element of trust needed – trust in the developers to build good software; trust in the consensus
mechanism to be non-collusive; trust that no entity (government or corporation) could reach a 51% threshold and
take over the blockchain.
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chain.23 The consensus mechanism can be adjusted or molded to fit specific applications.24 But
it is the consensus mechanism that makes a blockchain database highly trustworthy; trustworthy
even in the presence of hostile third parties trying to manipulate the registry.
In a marijuana blockchain application, each daily inventory measure, each movement of
marijuana (cultivator-to-transport-to-distributor) is recorded and protected in the same manner as
an invoiced-sale is preserved in VAT compliance systems. Digital signatures are used. Records
are sent by one party to the “public key” of the counter-party. The transmission is digitally
signed using the sender’s “private key.” In order to complete the movement, the sender proves
ownership of the “private key.” The entity receiving the marijuana will verify the digital
signature using the “public key” of the sender.
If the daily inventory measurement observes that a marijuana plant, or packet, or
marijuana infused product has not moved since the previous day’s inventory a self-assessment
(cultivator-to-himself, or distributor-to-himself) transaction is recorded. In this way, we know
with precision the location of all the marijuana in the supply chain.
A private, rather than a public blockchain is proposed to store the data that is transferred
in the commercial production of legalized marijuana.25 HyperLedger Fabric is the preferred

23

Tim Swanson, Great Wall of Numbers Cryptoeconomics for beginners and experts alike, citing Vlad Zamfir of the
Ethereum project at the Cryptocurrency Research Group conference (brainstorming session) on Cryptoeconomics as
posted January 30, 2015 at: http://www.ofnumbers.com/2015/01/30/cryptoeconomics-for-beginners-and-expertsalike/. Cryptoeconomics is:
A formal discipline that studies protocols that govern the production, distribution and consumption
of goods and services in a decentralized digital economy. Cryptoeconomics is a practical science
that focuses on the design and characterization of these protocols.
24
Cryptoeconomic incentives are most strongly associated with cryptocurrency systems. Bitcoin mining is such an
incentive system. This is because Bitcoin uses pseudonymous and anonymous nodes to validate transactions,
whereas a basic distributive ledger that engage entities with legal identities (banks, financial institutions,
government agencies) will use “permissioned” nodes to validate transactions. This proposal of a marijuana
blockchain uses permissioned nodes. For this reason, a basic distributive ledger is able to host off-chain assets
(smart contracts) due to their authenticated, permissioned approach to validation. Tim Swanson, Consensus-as-aService: A Brief Report on the Emergence of Permissioned, Distributed Ledger System (April 6, 2016) available at:
http://www.ofnumbers.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/04/Permissioned-distributed-ledgers.pdf.
25
A full examination of the selection of a private ledger is left for another time. Bitcoin uses a public (as opposed
to a private) decentralized ledger. The term public means that a ledger is accessible by every internet user. Anyone
can participate in the verification process and determine which blocks can be added to the chain (the mining
process). Bitcoin’s consensus mechanism is a very expensive proof-of-work mechanism. When the European
Central Bank (ECB) considered blockchain for post trading activities in securities, it rejected public ledgers, and
preferred private ledgers for the securities field. They did this to bring into sharp relief the use of white lists (or
black list) of users, who are identified through KYB (know your bank) or KYC (know your customer) procedures.
This process is common in traditional finance. Among all the following writers it is clear that private, restricted, or
permissioned distributed ledgers work best in a governmental context. Vitalik Buterin, On Public and Private
Blockchain ETHERIUM BLOG (August 7, 2015) available at: https://blog.ethereum.org/2015/08/07/on-public-andprivate-blockchains/; Tim Swanson, Consensus-as-a-Service: a brief report on the emergence of permissioned,
distributed ledger systems (working paper, April 6, 2015) at 4, available at: http://www.ofnumbers.com/wpcontent/uploads/2015/04/Permissioned-distributed-ledgers.pdf; European Central Bank, Distributed Ledger
Technologies in Securities Post-trading: Revolution or Evolution? OCCASIONAL PAPER SERIES, No. 172 (April
2016) available at: https://www.ecb.europa.eu/pub/pdf/scpops/ecbop172.en.pdf; Marcella Atzori, Blockchain
Technology and Decentralized Governance: Is the State Still Necessary? (December 2015) at 16-24, available at:

8
Electroniccopy
copyavailable
available at:
at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3239977
Electronic
https://ssrn.com/abstract=3239977

blockchain platform.26 Fabric is designed for consortiums where the participants are known, and
has proven successful in a long-running proof-of-concept by the interbank messaging platform
SWIFT.27 Their identities are registered and verified with a central registry service inside the
system.
The most popular consensus mechanism used in HyperLedger Fabric is the Practical
Byzantine Fault Tolerance (PBTF), which employs three types of nodes (clients, peers and order
servicing nodes in HyperLedger Fabric terminology28):
• Clients – are nodes that submit the actual transaction proposal to the endorsers, who in
turn approve the transaction-proposal according to pre-defined endorsement policies
determined by the configuration block29 of the channel.30 This is accomplished by
endorser nodes providing a digital signature of validation. The endorser then returns the
approved transaction proposal to the client so they can update their copy of the ledger.
The client also “invokes”31 the ordering service nodes, who will broadcast the
transaction-proposal to the peers who in turn verify the endorser nodes validation of the
client’s transaction-proposal and assure that there has been no “double spending.”32
o In the marijuana blockchain configuration the clients are the cultivators,
manufacturers, labs, distributors, retailers and each of the transporters that are
sending daily inventory data to the state regulator.

http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2709713 (discussing the difference between private and public
distributive ledgers and opting strongly for private ledgers in the government sphere).
26
HyperLedger is an open source collaborative effort to advance cross-industries blockchain technologies, hosted by
Linux. Fabric is the private (permissioned) blockchain infrastructure, originally contributed by IBM and Digital
Asset. HyperLedger Fabic is currently the most popular private distributive ledger. IBM states that Hyperledger
Fabric deployed in a single cloud data center achieves an end-to end throughput of more than 3,500 transactions per
second with latency of less than one second. See: Marko Vukolic, Behind the Architecture of HyperLedger Fabric,
BLOCKCHAIN, CRYPTOGRAPHY, IBM RESEARCH-ZURICH, (February 2, 2018) available at:
https://www.ibm.com/blogs/research/2018/02/architecture-hyperledger-fabric/. Additionally, as laid out in this
paper, they believe the ordering service could theoretically reach a maximum rate of 8,400 signatures a second. If
the block size is 10 transaction-proposals per block, we would have a theoretical upper bound of 84,000
transactions/second. Joao Sousa, Alysson Bessani & Marko Vukolic, A Byzantine Fault-Tolerant Ordering Service
for the HyperLedger Fabric Blockchain Platform, arXiv:1709.06921v1 [cs.CR] (September 20, 2017) at § 6,
available at: https://arxiv.org/pdf/1709.06921.pdf.
27
Nkihilesh De, SWIFT Claims “Huge” Progress on DLT Bank Pilot, C OINDESK (March 8, 2018) available at:
https://www.coindesk.com/swift-announces-successful-proof-of-concept-trial-for-dlt-platform/
28
Because HyperLedger Fabric has special terminology we have remained true to its usage, but provided definitions
in notes to help the reader. All definitions taken from http://fabrictestdocs.readthedocs.io/en/latest/glossary.html.
29
Configuration block: Contains the configuration data defining members and policies for a system chain (order
service) or channel. Any configuration modifications to a channel or overall network (e.g. a member leaving or
joining) will result in a new configuration block being appended to the appropriate chain. This block will contain the
contents of the genesis block, plus the delta.
30
Channel: A private blockchain overlay which allows for data isolation and confidentiality. A channel-specific
ledger is shared across the peers in the channel, and transacting parties must be properly authenticated to a channel
in order to interact with it. Channels are defined by a configuration-block.
31
Invoke: Used to call chaincode functions. Invocations are captured as transaction proposals, which then pass
through a modular flow of endorsement, ordering, validation, committal. The structure of invoke is a function and an
array of arguments.
32
Double spend: Refers to the transaction-proposal not already being “committed” to a block.
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•

Peers – are nodes33 that execute, and maintain a ledger of transactions.34 There are two
roles for a peer – endorser35 and committer. The architecture has been designed such that
a peer is always a committer, but not necessarily always an endorser. When a peer
“commits” a transaction, they are appending the validated transaction to the channelspecific ledger.36 Peer nodes can also have a special role of being an endorser
peer. There are two discrete peer-related functions that need to be performed by the
States that have legalized marijuana in the marijuana blockchain proposed here.
Governmental performance is bifurcated in two functional areas:
o First function: the State marijuana regulating agency receives daily inventory/
RDID-based reports (transaction-proposals) from the supply chain entities
(clients) under current State law. Under the proposed marijuana blockchain it will
encrypt and endorse them if they meet the endorsement policy37 criteria of the
blockchain. The State marijuana regulating agency will then send back the
signed transaction-proposal responses to the client nodes.
▪ The client nodes then submit the transactions and signatures to the
ordering service nodes, that is, they “invoke” the services of the order
servicing nodes which create a batch, or block, of transactions and deliver
them to committing peers.
▪ When a committing peer receives a batch of transactions, it validates that
the endorsement policy was met and checks in the read/ write sets to
detect conflicting transactions.38 If both checks are passed, the block is
committed to the ledger, and the state updates for each transaction as
reflected in the database. 39
▪ For purposes of the marijuana blockchain proposed here, the State
marijuana regulating agency will also identify and verify marijuana loss
estimates from each client entity. For example, in cultivation
approximately 50% of tagged plants do not grow correctly and are
discarded. Similarly, in the manufacturing process approximately 35% of

33

Node: An individual entity in the blockchain network. Any entity (node) is required to maintain a member
identity on the network.
34
Transaction: Invoke or instantiate results that are submitted for ordering, validation, and commit. Invokes are
requests to read/write data from the ledger. Instantiate is a request to start and initialize a chaincode on a channel.
Application clients gather invoke or instantiate responses from endorsing peers and package the results and
endorsements into a transaction that is submitted for ordering, validation, and commit.
35
Endorsers: Refers to the process where specific peer nodes execute a chaincode (smart contract) transaction and
return a proposal response to the client application.
36
Peers can have specific roles. An endorser peer is responsible for simulating transactions, and in turn preventing
unstable or non-deterministic transactions from passing through the network. Data is sent to an endorser in the form
of a proposal. Endorsing peers are normally committing peers (i.e. they write to the ledger), except for highly
regulated areas (like that involved with the marijuana blockchain considered here). A committing peer appends the
validated transactions to the channel-specific ledger. Although a peer can act as both an endorser and committer, in
highly regulated circumstances, it serves only as a committer. HYPERLEDGER, rev. 35dfac4e, HyperLedger Fabric
Glossary, at Endorser and at Committer, available at: http://hyperledgerdocs.readthedocs.io/en/latest/glossary.html
37
Endorsement policy: Defines the peer nodes on a channel that must execute transactions attached to a specific
chaincode application, and the required combination of responses (endorsements). A policy could require that a
transaction be endorsed by a minimum number of endorsing peers, a minimum percentage of endorsing peers, or by
all endorsing peers that are assigned to a specific chaincode application.
38
Read is a query to verify the status of something in the ledger. Write is to make a transaction in the ledger.
39
State here is used to refer to the current state data that is stored in the blockchain.
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•

•

products have defects and do not end up as finished product. State
agencies acting as first function peers in this proposed blockchain would
be: for example:
• California Department of Food and Agriculture (CDFA), or
• Vermont Department of Public Safety (VDPS);
Ordering-service nodes (OSNs) or orderer nodes 40 – are a collection of network entities
that perform the ordering service – ordering transactions into bocks according to the
network’s ordering implementation. Data is “broadcast” (by the orders) to the
committing peers, and is “delivered” as blocks to the marijuana blockchain. 41
o Second function: the State technology agency will participate as OSNs and
committing peers in the marijuana blockchain. They will assemble the blocks.
This activity is independent of the oversight function performed by the State
marijuana regulatory agency (above). State agencies acting as OSNs would be,
for example:
▪ California Department of Technology, or
▪ Vermont Office of Technology Management.
Additional peers. There is a critical need for additional peers (in addition to the State
marijuana regulating agency and the State technology agency) to provide for a smoothly
functioning marijuana blockchain. As a private blockchain those peers must be identified
and highly trusted, and would probably include the State police, the State auditor’s office
(tax division) and the Department of Revenue.

Figure 3(below) illustrates a HyperLedger Fabric blockchain deploying a Practical
Byzantine Fault Tolerance consensus mechanism in a legalized marijuana fact pattern. The
illustration assumes that all 28 states that have legalized marijuana participate. Space allows
only five of these States to appear in the diagram (California, Hawaii, Alaska, Vermont and
Massachusetts). 448 nodes are easily foreseeable but cannot be easily diagramed. 42
The illustration reads from the bottom-up. At the end of each day client nodes
(cultivator, manufacturer, laboratory, distributor, retailer, and each third-party transportation
firm) transmit the digital inventory report to the state marijuana oversight agency (endorsing peer
#1). The example utilizes one supply chain in Massachusetts under the METRC TAT to submit
inventory records (transaction-proposals) to the Massachusetts Cannabis Commission (MCC).
As an endorsing node the MCC will approve (or reject) the transaction-proposal
according to pre-defined endorsement policies and communicate this assessment to the client
(see the double arrows between each client and the first endorsing peer, marked by a “1” in a
40

The ordering service can support multiple channels similar to the topics of a publish/subscribe messaging system.
Clients can be given access to certain channels depending on the information that is shared or who it is relevant for.
For example, there could be a California only channel or a channel only for cultivators. Channels can be thought of
as partitions – clients connecting to one channel are unaware of the existence of other channels, but clients may
connect to multiple channels.
41
HYPERLEDGER, rev. 35dfac4e, HyperLedger Fabric Glossary, at Orderer, available at:
http://hyperledgerdocs.readthedocs.io/en/latest/glossary.html
42
28 State marijuana regulatory agencies [28] + 28 State technology agencies [28] + 28 State police, State auditor
(tax office), and State DOR [84] + 5 registered marijuana businesses in each state’s supply chain [140] + 6 thirdparty registered transport firms in each state [168] = 448.
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circle). Under the hypothetical marijuana blockchain represented in Figure 3 the OSNs cannot
be “invoked” until three endorsing peers have validated a transaction-proposal. As a result, the
cultivator (blue box) waits for additional endorsing peers. In this example endorsing peers from
California [CA] and Washington [WA] validate.43 See the double arrows marked by a “2” in a
circle and a “3” in a circle.
When a client node receives validations from three endorsing nodes, it invokes the
broadcast services of the OSNs (by submitting a copy of the transaction-proposal that includes
the digital signatures of the three endorsers to the OSNs). This “invocation” is represented by
the sweeping red arrow.
At this point the OSNs broadcast the transaction-proposal to other nodes and arranges the
new transactions into bocks according to the network’s ordering implementation. 44 The OSNs
will respect any channeling protocols of the marijuana blockchain. Channeling protocols will
limit access to the data based on permission-levels. (For example, State enforcement agencies
may have wide access permission, but a specific manufacturer/ client may have permission to
access data only from a channel that includes its immediate upstream cultivators and immediate
downstream distributors).
When committing nodes receive the broadcast and new blocks they will “commit” the
blocks to their copy of the distributed ledger. This action is deterministic – all nodes will reach
the same valid/ invalid conclusion for the data. They will additionally verify that endorsement
policies were followed when the endorsing peers validated the transaction-proposal. In Figure 3
committing nodes from the technology departments of the States of California, Hawaii, Alaska
and Vermont represent all similar nodes.
In this illustration California (the Department of Technology), Hawaii (the Office of
Technology Services), Alaska (the Office of Information Technology) and Vermont (Office if
Technology Management) were selected as committing peers largely because time zone
differences and estimated work-loads made it easy to see how these states could verify end-ofday inventory submissions from Massachusetts.45
43

There is an assumption that at close of business in Massachusetts it would be more likely to find an endorsing
node on the West Coast than on the East Coast.
44
During the ordering service process transaction-proposals are sorted on a first-come-first-serve basis. The
organization is chronological by channel as information is placed into blocks. Transactions within the blocks are
broadcast to the peer nodes who must verify them as valid or invalid. Figure 3 represented this first-come-first-serve
sorting process by placing transaction-proposals from the cultivators in Massachusetts, Maine, Vermont, and
Pennsylvania along with a Massachusetts manufacturer in the same block under the premise that East Coast
cultivators would be first in line at business closing. It assumes that the timing of their submissions would closely
approximate one another. The second new block collects the transaction-proposals from the remaining entities in the
Massachusetts supply chain and bundles them with a Pennsylvania retailer and a Delaware distributor. For a
discussion of some of the practical problems around organizing transactions within blocks see: Kostas Christidis, A
Kafka-based Ordering Service for Fabric, available at:
https://docs.google.com/document/d/1vNMaM7XhOlu9tB_10dKnlrhy5d7b1u8lSY8a-kVjCO4/edit
45
Technically, there is no need for a “end-of-day” submission. State statutes and the METRC systems function on
this schedule. The proposed system is designed to (theoretically) handle 84,000 transactions a second, which is a
speed sufficient to enable real time data transmission and validation. Similarly, there is no need for an “end” to each
day as the system will run 24/7.
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Figure 3
HyperLedger Fabric with Practical Byzantine Fault Tolerance (PBFT)
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In this illustration the marijuana blockchain is developed by the states. The blockchain
could be started by one states, California for example, and other states could join in time. Then
again, with a more cooperative federal administration the blockchain could be sponsored by the
federal government. The Financial Times indicates that there have been discussions between
420blockchain,46 a group working to bring together the cannabis industry, and the Congressional
Cannabis Caucus about using blockchain to regulate marijuana.47 This is how such a blockchain
would be designed.
CONCLUSION
The marijuana supply chain is (potentially) a highly porous highway distributing
marijuana throughout a State. It is secured with technology (STS or TAT), but the data is

46

420Blockchain, Uniting the Cannabis Industry: True Transparency, Smart Contracts & Mobile Engagement,
available at: http://420blockchain.cloud; Erin Mundahl, Could Blockchain Technology Be the Answer for Regulating
Cannabis Growth and Sales? FINANCIAL TIMES (February 9, 2018) available at:
https://www.ft.com/stream/837baaa6-b895-3123-9bd7-0553f688f8b9
47
John Authers, Authers Note: Tough Times for The Onion (Premium) (February 8, 2018) available with premium
subscription at: https://www.ft.com/stream/837baaa6-b895-3123-9bd7-0553f688f8b9
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(currently) stored in vertical silos. There may be multiple layers of redundancy behind the silos,
but they are vulnerable (hackable) silos non-the-less. No State has established security along a
main marijuana supply chain comparable to that of a robust, well designed blockchain.
The blockchain envisioned in this paper would have in excess of 448 State controlled
replicating nodes preserving transaction data in 28 or more States. Loosing encrypted
transaction records from all or most of the nodes would be unlikely.
Data silos are vulnerable to malicious attack. Entire State systems have been taken down.
MJ Freeway was taken off line nation-wide. TAT and STS data has been destroyed, lost and
corrupted. When data security is compromised, marijuana can easily slip into the black market
through any one of ten separate “leakage points.”
As Part 4 of this series will explain, the marijuana that “leaks out” of the supply chain
does not necessarily physically leave the chain itself; it may just leave the “digital record” of the
chain. Untracked resales of marijuana may be processed (tax free) through a legitimate
dispensary that is equipped with Zapper of Phantomware suppression device. There would be no
record of the final sale, or the cash it was exchanged for. Once marijuana makes it outside the
track and trace or seed to sale systems tax losses arise, and federal concerns under the
Controlled Substances Act and the Bank Secrecy Act are heightened.
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